SA

SAUDI ARABIA

Intel Environment

Military Alliance
Interior Intelligence Services
Exterior Intelligence Services
Military Intelligence Services
SIGINT/COMINT Alliances

Telco/Carrier/ISP Environment

Type	Name	Ownership	Main Office	URL	Notes
GSM 900	Etihad Etisalat Company (Mobily)	Etisalat
3G 2100	Etihad Etisalat Company (Mobily)	Etisalat
GSM 900/1800	MTC Saudi Arabia (Zain Saudi Arabia)	Zain
3G 2100	MTC Saudi Arabia (Zain Saudi Arabia)	Zain
GSM 900	Saudi Telecom Company (STC)
3G 2100	Saudi Telecom Company (STC)
TD-LTE 2300	Saudi Telecom Company (STC)

Transnational Cables and Connections

Type	Name	Ownership	Connecting Point A	Connection Points B	URL/Notes
3,84 Tbs	EIG			Tripoli (LY) / Abu Talat (EG) / Al Fujaurah (AE) / Barka (OM) / Djibouti (DJ) / Gibraltar (GI) / Jeddah (SA) / London (GB) / Marseille (FR) / Monaco (MC) / Mumbai (IN) / Sesimbra (PT) / Widemouth Bay (GB) / Zaferana (EG)	Operator WP
480 Gbits/s	SEA-ME-WE-3			Norden (DE) / Oostende (BE) / Goonhilly (GB) / Penmarch (FR) / Sesimbra (PT) / Tetuan (MA) / Mazara del Vallo (IT) / Chania (GR) / Marmaris (TR) / Yeroskipou (CY) / Alexandria (EG) / Suez (EG) / Jeddah (SA) / Djibouti (DJ) / Muscat (OM) / Fujairah (AE) / Karachi (PK) / Mumbai (IN) / Cochin (IN) / Mount Lavinia (LK) / Pyapon (MM) / Satun (TH) / Penang, (MY) (Where it meets the SAFE and the FLAG cables.) / Medan (IN) / Tuas (SG) / Jakarta (IN) / Perth (AU) / Mersing (MY) / Tungku (BN) / Da Nang (VN) / Batangas (PH) / Taipa (MO) / Deep Water Bay (HK) / Shantou (CN) / Fangshan (TW) / Toucheng (TW) / Shanghai (CN) / Keoje (KR) / Okinawa, (JP)	WP

SIGINT/COMINT Stations and Operators

Name	Location	Operator	Capabilities
	Araz	SA-operated "accommodation site" that provides occasional SIGINT product to the US INSCOM
	Khafji	SA-operated "accommodation site" that provides occasional SIGINT product to the US INSCOM

Vendor Appearance

• 2013: HACKINGTEAM see securelist.com Report 20130425

Articles / Events / Situations

Date	Source	Title	Tags
20131006	nzz.ch	Heikles Geschäft: Überwachungs-Software für Saudiarabien - Die Firma von Ruedi Noser verkauft Überwachungs- Software ins autokratische Saudiarabien. Der FDP- Nationalrat sieht darin kein Problem.	CH / NEXUS TELECOM / SA
20130904	wikileaks.org	HACKINGTEAM: Mostapaha Maana	HACKINGTEAM / MAANA, MOSTAPHA / IT / CH / US / MA / MY / SG / LB / NL / FR / EG / AE / TR / DE / SA / QA / SD / CZ / OM
20130802	cryptome.org	NSA X-KEYSCORE Server Sites	XKEYSCORE / US / MX / HN / CR / PA / VE / CO / EC / BR / GB / FR / DE / AT / IT / ES / PL / BY / RU / RO / GR / CZ / DZ / MA / EG / SD / SO / CM / NA / ZW / SA / TR / IQ / KW / BH / QA / AE / UZ / KG / AF / PK / IN / JP / CN / PH / MM / TH / KH / MY / AU / NZ
20130513	thoughtcrime.org	A Saudi Arabia Telecom's Surveillance Pitch	SA
20130425	securelist.com	Spyware. HackingTeam	HACKINGTEAM / MX / IT / VN / AE / IQ / LB / MA / PA / TJ / IN / IR / SA / KR / ES / PL / TR / AR / CA / ML / OM / CN / US / KZ / EG / UA / UZ / CO / TW / BR / RU / KG / GB / BH / ET / ID / DE / LY
20130312	bugbrother.blog.lemonde.fr	Amesys: les documents qui impliquent Ziad Takieddine et Philippe Vannier, le PDG de Bull	AMESYS / MA / AE / GA / SA / KZ / LY
20130127	munkschool.utoronto.ca	PLANET BLUE COAT: MAPPING GLOBAL CENSORSHIP AND SURVEILLANCE TOOLS	BLUECOAT / EG / KW / QA / SA / AE / AF / BH / CN / IN / ID / IQ / KE / LB / MY / NG / RU / KR / SG / TH / TR / VE
01.06.2011	Wall Street Journal	Mideast Uses Western Tools to Battle the Skype Rebellion	Skype Finfisher Gamma Egypt Oman Saudi Arabia China

Unconfirmed Rumors

• FINFISHER said to have been sold to SA Government, [Confirmation needed]