Difference between revisions of "SUBCOMCAB"

From Buggedplanet.info
Jump to navigationJump to search
 
(16 intermediate revisions by the same user not shown)
Line 1: Line 1:
−
= Cables Overview =
+
= Cables Overview (Incomplete, Work in Progress) =
  
 
{|border=1
 
{|border=1
Line 5: Line 5:
 
|Type||Name||Owner||Landing Points||Ressources/Comments
 
|Type||Name||Owner||Landing Points||Ressources/Comments
 
|-
 
|-
−
|2,88 Tbit/s||AAG (Asia-America Gateway)|| ||Changi ([[SG]]) / Keawaula (Hawaii) / La Union ([[PH]]) / Lantau ([[HK]]) / Mersing ([[MY]]) / San Luis Obispo (AT&T) ([[US]]) / Sri Racha ([[TH]]) / Tanguisson ([[GU]]) / Tungku ([[BN]]) / Vung Tau ([[VN]])||[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AAG_(cable_system) WP] [http://www.asia-america-gateway.com/ Operator]
+
|2,88 Tbit/s||[[AAG|AAG (Asia-America Gateway)]]|| ||Changi ([[SG]]) / Keawaula (Hawaii) / La Union ([[PH]]) / Lantau ([[HK]]) / Mersing ([[MY]]) / San Luis Obispo (AT&T) ([[US]]) / Sri Racha ([[TH]]) / Tanguisson ([[GU]]) / Tungku ([[BN]]) / Vung Tau ([[VN]])||[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AAG_(cable_system) WP] [http://www.asia-america-gateway.com/ Operator]
 
|-
 
|-
−
|120 Gbit/s||AC1 (Atlantic Crossing 1)||Tyco / Global Telesystems Ltd||Brookhaven Cable Station in Shirley, New York ([[US]]) / Land's End Cable Station in Whitesands, ([[GB|UK]]) / Westerland Cable Station on Sylt ([[DE]]) / KPN Telecom cable station, Beverwijk ([[NL]]) ||[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AC-1_(cable_system) WP]
+
|120 Gbit/s||[[AC1|AC1 (Atlantic Crossing 1)]]||Tyco / Global Telesystems Ltd||Brookhaven Cable Station in Shirley, New York ([[US]]) / Land's End Cable Station in Whitesands, ([[GB|UK]]) / Westerland Cable Station on Sylt ([[DE]]) / KPN Telecom cable station, Beverwijk ([[NL]]) ||[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AC-1_(cable_system) WP]
 
|-
 
|-
 
|320 Gbit/s||AC2 (Atlantic Crossing 2)||Level 3 Communications and Global Crossing Ltd.||Bellport/Brookhaven, New York ([[US]]) / Bude, [[GB|UK]]||[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AC-2_(cable_system) WP]
 
|320 Gbit/s||AC2 (Atlantic Crossing 2)||Level 3 Communications and Global Crossing Ltd.||Bellport/Brookhaven, New York ([[US]]) / Bude, [[GB|UK]]||[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/AC-2_(cable_system) WP]
Line 13: Line 13:
 
|5.12 Tbit/s||ACE (Africa Cost to Europe)|| ||Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe and Sierra Leone.||[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACE_(cable_system) WP] [http://www.ace-submarinecable.com/ Operator] In Planning for Q2/2012
 
|5.12 Tbit/s||ACE (Africa Cost to Europe)|| ||Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe and Sierra Leone.||[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ACE_(cable_system) WP] [http://www.ace-submarinecable.com/ Operator] In Planning for Q2/2012
 
|-
 
|-
−
|480 Gbits/s||SEA-ME-WE-3|| ||Norden ([[DE]]) / Oostende ([[BE]]) / Goonhilly ([[GB]]) / Penmarch ([[FR]]) / Sesimbra ([[PT]]) / Tetuan ([[MA]]) / Mazara del Vallo ([[IT]]) / Chania ([[GR]]) / Marmaris ([[TR]]) / Yeroskipou ([[CY]]) / Alexandria ([[EG]]) / Suez ([[EG]]) / Jeddah ([[SA]]) / Djibouti ([[DJ]]) / Muscat ([[OM]]) / Fujairah ([[AE]]) / Karachi ([[PK]]) / Mumbai ([[IN]])  / Cochin ([[IN]])  / Mount Lavinia ([[LK]]) / Pyapon ([[MM]]) / Satun ([[TH]]) / Penang, ([[MY]]) (Where it meets the SAFE and the FLAG cables.) / Medan ([[IN]]) / Tuas ([[SG]]) / Jakarta ([[IN]])  / Perth ([[AU]]) / Mersing ([[MY]]) / Tungku ([[BN]]) / Da Nang ([[VN]]) / Batangas ([[PH]]) / Taipa ([[MO]]) / Deep Water Bay ([[HK]]) / Shantou ([[CN]]) / Fangshan ([[TW]]) / Toucheng ([[TW]]) / Shanghai ([[CN]]) / Keoje ([[KR]]) / Okinawa, ([[JP]])||[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SEA-ME-WE_3 WP]
+
|480 Gbits/s||[[SEA-ME-WE-3]]|| ||Norden ([[DE]]) / Oostende ([[BE]]) / Goonhilly ([[GB]]) / Penmarch ([[FR]]) / Sesimbra ([[PT]]) / Tetuan ([[MA]]) / Mazara del Vallo ([[IT]]) / Chania ([[GR]]) / Marmaris ([[TR]]) / Yeroskipou ([[CY]]) / Alexandria ([[EG]]) / Suez ([[EG]]) / Jeddah ([[SA]]) / Djibouti ([[DJ]]) / Muscat ([[OM]]) / Fujairah ([[AE]]) / Karachi ([[PK]]) / Mumbai ([[IN]])  / Cochin ([[IN]])  / Mount Lavinia ([[LK]]) / Pyapon ([[MM]]) / Satun ([[TH]]) / Penang, ([[MY]]) (Where it meets the SAFE and the FLAG cables.) / Medan ([[IN]]) / Tuas ([[SG]]) / Jakarta ([[IN]])  / Perth ([[AU]]) / Mersing ([[MY]]) / Tungku ([[BN]]) / Da Nang ([[VN]]) / Batangas ([[PH]]) / Taipa ([[MO]]) / Deep Water Bay ([[HK]]) / Shantou ([[CN]]) / Fangshan ([[TW]]) / Toucheng ([[TW]]) / Shanghai ([[CN]]) / Keoje ([[KR]]) / Okinawa, ([[JP]])||[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SEA-ME-WE_3 WP]
 
|-
 
|-
−
|1,28 Tbs||SEA-ME-WE-4|| || Al Fujaurah ([[AE]]) / Alexandria ([[EG]]) / Annaba ([[DZ]]) / Bizerte ([[TN]]) / Chennai (Madras) ([[IN]]) / Colombo ([[LK]]) / Cox's Bazaar ([[BD]]) / Jeddah ([[SA]]) / Karachi ([[PK]]) / Malacca Town ([[MY]]) / Marseille ([[FR]]) / Mumbai ([[IN]]) / Palermo ([[IT]]) / Satun ([[TH]]) / Suez ([[EG]]) / Tuas ([[SG]]) || [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SEA-ME-WE_4 WP] [http://www.seamewe4.com/ Operator]
+
|1,28 Tbs||[[SEA-ME-WE-4]]|| || Al Fujaurah ([[AE]]) / Alexandria ([[EG]]) / Annaba ([[DZ]]) / Bizerte ([[TN]]) / Chennai (Madras) ([[IN]]) / Colombo ([[LK]]) / Cox's Bazaar ([[BD]]) / Jeddah ([[SA]]) / Karachi ([[PK]]) / Malacca Town ([[MY]]) / Marseille ([[FR]]) / Mumbai ([[IN]]) / Palermo ([[IT]]) / Satun ([[TH]]) / Suez ([[EG]]) / Tuas ([[SG]]) || [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SEA-ME-WE_4 WP] [http://www.seamewe4.com/ Operator]
 
|-
 
|-
 
|}
 
|}
  
−
= Events / Articles / Situations =
+
= Articles / Events / Situations =
  
 
{|border=1
 
{|border=1
 
|-
 
|-
 
|Date||Source||Title||Tags
 
|Date||Source||Title||Tags
 +
|-
 +
|20180305||lawfareblog.com||[https://www.lawfareblog.com/evaluating-russian-threat-undersea-cables Cybersecurity and Deterrence: Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables]||[[SUBCOMCAB]]
 +
|-
 +
|20171222||washingtonpost.com||[https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russian-submarines-are-prowling-around-vital-undersea-cables-its-making-nato-nervous/2017/12/22/d4c1f3da-e5d0-11e7-927a-e72eac1e73b6_story.html?utm_term=.158b8dc68f75 Europe: Russian submarines are prowling around vital undersea cables. It’s making NATO nervous.]||[[SUBCOMCAB]]
 +
|-
 +
|20171215||bbc.com||[http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-42362500 Russia a 'risk' to undersea cables, defence chief warns]||[[SUBCOMCAB]]
 +
|-
 +
|2017||policyexchange.org.uk||[https://policyexchange.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Undersea-Cables.pdf Undersea Cables: Indispensable, insecure]||[[SUBCOMCAB]]
 +
|-
 +
|20151025||nytimes.com||[https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/26/world/europe/russian-presence-near-undersea-cables-concerns-us.html Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close for U.S. Comfort]||[[SUBCOMCAB]]
 +
|-
 +
|20150903||wasingtontimes.com||[https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/3/us-shadows-russian-ship-near-nuke-submarine-bases/ U.S. shadows Russian ship near nuke submarine bases]||[[SUBCOMCAB]]
 
|-
 
|-
 
|20130621||guardian.co.uk||[http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world's communications - Exclusive: British spy agency collects and stores vast quantities of global email messages, Facebook posts, internet histories and calls, and shares them with NSA, latest documents from Edward Snowden reveal]||[[SUBCOMCAB]] / [[GB]] / [[GCHQ]] / [[US]] / [[NSA]] / [[MASTERING THE INTERNET]] / [[GLOBAL TELECOMS EXPLOITATION]] / [[TEMPORA]]
 
|20130621||guardian.co.uk||[http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2013/jun/21/gchq-cables-secret-world-communications-nsa GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world's communications - Exclusive: British spy agency collects and stores vast quantities of global email messages, Facebook posts, internet histories and calls, and shares them with NSA, latest documents from Edward Snowden reveal]||[[SUBCOMCAB]] / [[GB]] / [[GCHQ]] / [[US]] / [[NSA]] / [[MASTERING THE INTERNET]] / [[GLOBAL TELECOMS EXPLOITATION]] / [[TEMPORA]]
 
|-
 
|-
−
|20130327||bbc.co.uk||[http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21963100 Egypt arrests as undersea internet cable cut off Alexandria]||[[SEA-ME-WE 4]]
+
|20130327||bbc.co.uk||[http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-21963100 Egypt arrests as undersea internet cable cut off Alexandria]||[[SEA-ME-WE-4]]
 +
|-
 +
|2007||kes.info||[http://www.kes.info/archiv/online/07-6-014.htm Gläserne Leitung: Glasfaser-Netzwerke sind verletzlicher als oft gedacht - Neue Übertragungsverfahren erfordern zwar andere Angriffstechniken, schließen Angriffe aber nicht aus. Auch die Datenübertragung über Glasfasern ist – entgegen vielfach verbreiteter Meinung – nicht vor Lauschangriffen gefeit.]||[[SUBCOMCAB]]
 +
|-
 +
|20050220||nytimes.com||[http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/20/politics/20submarine.html?_r=0 New Nuclear Sub Is Said to Have Special Eavesdropping Ability]||[[SUBCOMCAB]]
 
|-
 
|-
 
|20010523||spiegel.de||[http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/interview-zum-horch-u-boot-nur-fuer-den-kriegsfall-zu-gebrauchen-a-135811.html Interview zum Horch-U-Boot: Nur für den Kriegsfall zu gebrauchen?]||[[SUBCOMCAB]]
 
|20010523||spiegel.de||[http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/interview-zum-horch-u-boot-nur-fuer-den-kriegsfall-zu-gebrauchen-a-135811.html Interview zum Horch-U-Boot: Nur für den Kriegsfall zu gebrauchen?]||[[SUBCOMCAB]]
 
|-
 
|-
 
|20010523||spiegel.de||[http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/lauschangriff-zapfen-geheimdienst-u-boote-telefonkabel-an-a-135608.html Lauschangriff: Zapfen Geheimdienst-U-Boote Telefonkabel an?]||[[SUBCOMCAB]] / [[NSA]]
 
|20010523||spiegel.de||[http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/lauschangriff-zapfen-geheimdienst-u-boote-telefonkabel-an-a-135608.html Lauschangriff: Zapfen Geheimdienst-U-Boote Telefonkabel an?]||[[SUBCOMCAB]] / [[NSA]]
 +
|-
 +
|20010527||cryptome.org||[http://cryptome.org/nsa-fibertap.htm Subject: Re: NSA tapping undersea fibers?]||[[NSA]] / [[SUBCOMCAB]]
 
|-
 
|-
 
|}
 
|}
Line 38: Line 56:
  
 
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_international_submarine_communications_cables
 
* http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_international_submarine_communications_cables
−
 
 
* http://www.cablemap.info/
 
* http://www.cablemap.info/
 +
* http://lifewinning.com/submarine-cable-taps/

Latest revision as of 03:35, 7 March 2018

Cables Overview (Incomplete, Work in Progress)

Type Name Owner Landing Points Ressources/Comments
2,88 Tbit/s AAG (Asia-America Gateway) Changi (SG) / Keawaula (Hawaii) / La Union (PH) / Lantau (HK) / Mersing (MY) / San Luis Obispo (AT&T) (US) / Sri Racha (TH) / Tanguisson (GU) / Tungku (BN) / Vung Tau (VN) WP Operator
120 Gbit/s AC1 (Atlantic Crossing 1) Tyco / Global Telesystems Ltd Brookhaven Cable Station in Shirley, New York (US) / Land's End Cable Station in Whitesands, (UK) / Westerland Cable Station on Sylt (DE) / KPN Telecom cable station, Beverwijk (NL) WP
320 Gbit/s AC2 (Atlantic Crossing 2) Level 3 Communications and Global Crossing Ltd. Bellport/Brookhaven, New York (US) / Bude, UK WP
5.12 Tbit/s ACE (Africa Cost to Europe) Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe and Sierra Leone. WP Operator In Planning for Q2/2012
480 Gbits/s SEA-ME-WE-3 Norden (DE) / Oostende (BE) / Goonhilly (GB) / Penmarch (FR) / Sesimbra (PT) / Tetuan (MA) / Mazara del Vallo (IT) / Chania (GR) / Marmaris (TR) / Yeroskipou (CY) / Alexandria (EG) / Suez (EG) / Jeddah (SA) / Djibouti (DJ) / Muscat (OM) / Fujairah (AE) / Karachi (PK) / Mumbai (IN) / Cochin (IN) / Mount Lavinia (LK) / Pyapon (MM) / Satun (TH) / Penang, (MY) (Where it meets the SAFE and the FLAG cables.) / Medan (IN) / Tuas (SG) / Jakarta (IN) / Perth (AU) / Mersing (MY) / Tungku (BN) / Da Nang (VN) / Batangas (PH) / Taipa (MO) / Deep Water Bay (HK) / Shantou (CN) / Fangshan (TW) / Toucheng (TW) / Shanghai (CN) / Keoje (KR) / Okinawa, (JP) WP
1,28 Tbs SEA-ME-WE-4 Al Fujaurah (AE) / Alexandria (EG) / Annaba (DZ) / Bizerte (TN) / Chennai (Madras) (IN) / Colombo (LK) / Cox's Bazaar (BD) / Jeddah (SA) / Karachi (PK) / Malacca Town (MY) / Marseille (FR) / Mumbai (IN) / Palermo (IT) / Satun (TH) / Suez (EG) / Tuas (SG) WP Operator

Articles / Events / Situations

Date Source Title Tags
20180305 lawfareblog.com Cybersecurity and Deterrence: Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables SUBCOMCAB
20171222 washingtonpost.com Europe: Russian submarines are prowling around vital undersea cables. It’s making NATO nervous. SUBCOMCAB
20171215 bbc.com Russia a 'risk' to undersea cables, defence chief warns SUBCOMCAB
2017 policyexchange.org.uk Undersea Cables: Indispensable, insecure SUBCOMCAB
20151025 nytimes.com Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close for U.S. Comfort SUBCOMCAB
20150903 wasingtontimes.com U.S. shadows Russian ship near nuke submarine bases SUBCOMCAB
20130621 guardian.co.uk GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world's communications - Exclusive: British spy agency collects and stores vast quantities of global email messages, Facebook posts, internet histories and calls, and shares them with NSA, latest documents from Edward Snowden reveal SUBCOMCAB / GB / GCHQ / US / NSA / MASTERING THE INTERNET / GLOBAL TELECOMS EXPLOITATION / TEMPORA
20130327 bbc.co.uk Egypt arrests as undersea internet cable cut off Alexandria SEA-ME-WE-4
2007 kes.info Gläserne Leitung: Glasfaser-Netzwerke sind verletzlicher als oft gedacht - Neue Übertragungsverfahren erfordern zwar andere Angriffstechniken, schließen Angriffe aber nicht aus. Auch die Datenübertragung über Glasfasern ist – entgegen vielfach verbreiteter Meinung – nicht vor Lauschangriffen gefeit. SUBCOMCAB
20050220 nytimes.com New Nuclear Sub Is Said to Have Special Eavesdropping Ability SUBCOMCAB
20010523 spiegel.de Interview zum Horch-U-Boot: Nur für den Kriegsfall zu gebrauchen? SUBCOMCAB
20010523 spiegel.de Lauschangriff: Zapfen Geheimdienst-U-Boote Telefonkabel an? SUBCOMCAB / NSA
20010527 cryptome.org Subject: Re: NSA tapping undersea fibers? NSA / SUBCOMCAB

Ressources

Retrieved from "https://buggedplanet.info/index.php?title=SUBCOMCAB&oldid=16280"