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Cables Overview (Incomplete, Work in Progress)

Type Name Owner Landing Points Ressources/Comments
2,88 Tbit/s AAG (Asia-America Gateway) Changi (SG) / Keawaula (Hawaii) / La Union (PH) / Lantau (HK) / Mersing (MY) / San Luis Obispo (AT&T) (US) / Sri Racha (TH) / Tanguisson (GU) / Tungku (BN) / Vung Tau (VN) WP Operator
120 Gbit/s AC1 (Atlantic Crossing 1) Tyco / Global Telesystems Ltd Brookhaven Cable Station in Shirley, New York (US) / Land's End Cable Station in Whitesands, (UK) / Westerland Cable Station on Sylt (DE) / KPN Telecom cable station, Beverwijk (NL) WP
320 Gbit/s AC2 (Atlantic Crossing 2) Level 3 Communications and Global Crossing Ltd. Bellport/Brookhaven, New York (US) / Bude, UK WP
5.12 Tbit/s ACE (Africa Cost to Europe) Equatorial Guinea, The Gambia, Guinea, Liberia, Mauritania, Sao Tome and Principe and Sierra Leone. WP Operator In Planning for Q2/2012
480 Gbits/s SEA-ME-WE-3 Norden (DE) / Oostende (BE) / Goonhilly (GB) / Penmarch (FR) / Sesimbra (PT) / Tetuan (MA) / Mazara del Vallo (IT) / Chania (GR) / Marmaris (TR) / Yeroskipou (CY) / Alexandria (EG) / Suez (EG) / Jeddah (SA) / Djibouti (DJ) / Muscat (OM) / Fujairah (AE) / Karachi (PK) / Mumbai (IN) / Cochin (IN) / Mount Lavinia (LK) / Pyapon (MM) / Satun (TH) / Penang, (MY) (Where it meets the SAFE and the FLAG cables.) / Medan (IN) / Tuas (SG) / Jakarta (IN) / Perth (AU) / Mersing (MY) / Tungku (BN) / Da Nang (VN) / Batangas (PH) / Taipa (MO) / Deep Water Bay (HK) / Shantou (CN) / Fangshan (TW) / Toucheng (TW) / Shanghai (CN) / Keoje (KR) / Okinawa, (JP) WP
1,28 Tbs SEA-ME-WE-4 Al Fujaurah (AE) / Alexandria (EG) / Annaba (DZ) / Bizerte (TN) / Chennai (Madras) (IN) / Colombo (LK) / Cox's Bazaar (BD) / Jeddah (SA) / Karachi (PK) / Malacca Town (MY) / Marseille (FR) / Mumbai (IN) / Palermo (IT) / Satun (TH) / Suez (EG) / Tuas (SG) WP Operator

Articles / Events / Situations

Date Source Title Tags
20180305 Cybersecurity and Deterrence: Evaluating the Russian Threat to Undersea Cables SUBCOMCAB
20171222 Europe: Russian submarines are prowling around vital undersea cables. It’s making NATO nervous. SUBCOMCAB
20171215 Russia a 'risk' to undersea cables, defence chief warns SUBCOMCAB
2017 Undersea Cables: Indispensable, insecure SUBCOMCAB
20151025 Russian Ships Near Data Cables Are Too Close for U.S. Comfort SUBCOMCAB
20150903 U.S. shadows Russian ship near nuke submarine bases SUBCOMCAB
20130621 GCHQ taps fibre-optic cables for secret access to world's communications - Exclusive: British spy agency collects and stores vast quantities of global email messages, Facebook posts, internet histories and calls, and shares them with NSA, latest documents from Edward Snowden reveal SUBCOMCAB / GB / GCHQ / US / NSA / MASTERING THE INTERNET / GLOBAL TELECOMS EXPLOITATION / TEMPORA
20130327 Egypt arrests as undersea internet cable cut off Alexandria SEA-ME-WE-4
2007 Gläserne Leitung: Glasfaser-Netzwerke sind verletzlicher als oft gedacht - Neue Übertragungsverfahren erfordern zwar andere Angriffstechniken, schließen Angriffe aber nicht aus. Auch die Datenübertragung über Glasfasern ist – entgegen vielfach verbreiteter Meinung – nicht vor Lauschangriffen gefeit. SUBCOMCAB
20050220 New Nuclear Sub Is Said to Have Special Eavesdropping Ability SUBCOMCAB
20010523 Interview zum Horch-U-Boot: Nur für den Kriegsfall zu gebrauchen? SUBCOMCAB
20010523 Lauschangriff: Zapfen Geheimdienst-U-Boote Telefonkabel an? SUBCOMCAB / NSA
20010527 Subject: Re: NSA tapping undersea fibers? NSA / SUBCOMCAB