Difference between revisions of "ZA"
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{|border=1 | {|border=1 | ||
|- | |- | ||
| − | |Type||Name||Ownership | + | |Type||Name||Ownership||URL||Notes |
|- | |- | ||
|3G 2100||Cell C (Pty) Ltd (Cell C)|| || || | |3G 2100||Cell C (Pty) Ltd (Cell C)|| || || | ||
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|GSM 900/1800||Cell C (Pty) Ltd (Cell C)|| || || | |GSM 900/1800||Cell C (Pty) Ltd (Cell C)|| || || | ||
|- | |- | ||
| − | |3G 2100||MTN - Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd. (MTN-SA)|| | + | |3G 2100||MTN - Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd. (MTN-SA)||MTN Group ([[ZA]])|| || |
|- | |- | ||
| − | |GSM 900||MTN - Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd. (MTN-SA)|| | + | |GSM 900||MTN - Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd. (MTN-SA)||MTN Group ([[ZA]])|| || |
|- | |- | ||
| − | |3G 900||MTN - Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd. (MTN-SA)|| | + | |3G 900||MTN - Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd. (MTN-SA)||MTN Group ([[ZA]])|| || |
|- | |- | ||
| − | |GSM 1800||MTN - Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd. (MTN-SA)|| | + | |GSM 1800||MTN - Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd. (MTN-SA)||MTN Group ([[ZA]])|| || |
|- | |- | ||
|3G 2100||Telkom SA Ltd (8ta)|| || || | |3G 2100||Telkom SA Ltd (8ta)|| || || | ||
| Line 64: | Line 64: | ||
= LI Legislation = | = LI Legislation = | ||
| + | |||
| + | * Regulation of Interception of Communications & Provision of Communications Act, No. 70/2000 related to the Information Act, 2002 | ||
= SIGINT/COMINT Legal Grounds = | = SIGINT/COMINT Legal Grounds = | ||
| Line 74: | Line 76: | ||
== Vendors with Service / Installations in South Africa == | == Vendors with Service / Installations in South Africa == | ||
| + | |||
| + | * 2013: [[GAMMA]] / [[FINFISHER]] see Citizenlab Report 20130430 | ||
= Articles / Events / Situations = | = Articles / Events / Situations = | ||
| − | [[Category:Countries]] | + | == 2019 == |
| + | |||
| + | {|border=1 | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |Date||Source||Title||Tags | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |20190815||privacyinternational.org||[https://privacyinternational.org/long-read/3164/two-states-admit-bulk-interception-practices-why-does-it-matter Two states admit bulk interception practices: why does it matter?]||[[GB]] / [[ZA]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |} | ||
| + | |||
| + | == 2018 == | ||
| + | |||
| + | {|border=1 | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |Date||Source||Title||Tags | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |20180328||qz.com||[https://qz.com/1239762/cambridge-analytica-scandal-all-the-countries-where-scl-elections-claims-to-have-worked/ Mapped: The breathtaking global reach of Cambridge Analytica’s parent company]||[[CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA]] / [[US]] / [[GB]] / [[AR]] / [[CO]] / [[GY]] / [[UY]] / [[TT]] / [[GD]] / [[VC]] / [[LC]] / [[KN]] / [[AG]] / [[CY]] / [[NG]] / [[GA]] / [[KY]] / [[ZM]] / [[ZA]] / [[LV]] / [[LT]] / [[UA]] / [[RO]] / [[IT]] / [[MD]] / [[AL]] / [[IN]] / [[PK]] / [[NP]] / [[TH]] / [[ID]] / [[PH]] / [[MU]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |} | ||
| + | |||
| + | == 2015 == | ||
| + | |||
| + | {|border=1 | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |Date||Source||Title||Tags | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |20150803||iol.co.za||[http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/grabber-nabbed-in-big-sting-1.1894536 ‘Grabber’ nabbed in big sting]||[[ZA]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |20150710||wikileaks.org||[https://wikileaks.org/hackingteam/emails/emailid/144932 HACKINGTEAM: /etc/LISTA.txt]||[[HACKINGTEAM]] / [[US]] / [[NL]] / [[BY]] / [[MY]] / [[TR]] / [[SA]] / [[KW]] / [[IN]] / [[ID]] / [[AE]] / [[GR]] / [[SG]] / [[CZ]] / [[IT]] / [[DE]] / [[FR]] / [[NO]] / [[RS]] / [[CY]] / [[LT]] / [[ZA]] / [[HU]] / [[PL]] / [[DK]] / [[NZ]] / [[ZW]] / [[SI]] / [[KR]] / [[VA]] / [[CH]] / [[ES]] / [[CA]] / [[MT]] / [[UY]] / [[VN]] / [[BG]] / [[KZ]] / [[MO]] / [[HR]] / [[GT]] / [[QA]] / [[AT]] / [[SB]] / [[JP]] / [[RO]] / [[NA]] / [[FI]] / [[SE]] / [[RU]] / [[BN]] / [[LB]] / [[GH]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |20150220||mg.co.za||[http://mg.co.za/article/2015-02-19-securocrats-serious-about-cyberwarfare Securocrats serious about cyberwarfare]||[[ZA]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |} | ||
| + | |||
| + | == 2014 == | ||
| + | |||
| + | {|border=1 | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |Date||Source||Title||Tags | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |20140915||wikileaks.org||[https://wikileaks.org/spyfiles4/customers.html FinFisher - Customers]||[[FINFISHER]] / [[GAMMA]] / [[COBHAM]] / [[DYPLEX COMMUNICATIONS]] / [[ELAMAN]] / [[TROVICOR]] / [[SK]] / [[MN]] / [[QA]] / [[ZA]] / [[BH]] / [[PK]] / [[EE]] / [[VN]] / [[AU]] / [[BE]] / [[NG]] / [[NL]] / [[SG]] / [[BD]] / [[HU]] / [[IT]] / [[BA]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |20140606||theguardian.com||[http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/jun/06/vodafone-reveals-secret-wires-allowing-state-surveillance Vodafone reveals existence of secret wires that allow state surveillance: Wires allow agencies to listen to or record live conversations, in what privacy campaigners are calling a 'nightmare scenario']||[[VODAFONE]] / [[AL]] / [[AU]] / [[BE]] / [[CZ]] / [[CG]] / [[EG]] / [[FJ]] / [[FR]] / [[DE]] / [[GH]] / [[GR]] / [[HU]] / [[IN]] / [[IE]] / [[IT]] / [[KE]] / [[LS]] / [[MT]] / [[MZ]] / [[NL]] / [[NZ]] / [[PT]] / [[QA]] / [[RO]] / [[ZA]] / [[ES]] / [[TZ]] / [[TR]] / [[GB]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |} | ||
| + | |||
| + | == 2013 == | ||
| + | |||
| + | {|border=1 | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |Date||Source||Title||Tags | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |20130912||mybroadband.co.za||[http://mybroadband.co.za/news/security/86437-spyware-servers-in-sa-more-details-emerge.html Spyware servers in SA: more details emerge - Information from Wikileaks offers another link between the makers of the FinFisher surveillance sofware suite and South Africa]||[[ZA]] / [[FINFISHER]] / [[GAMMA]] / [[ELAMAN]] / [[RUMSCHEIDT, HOLGER]] / [[NELSON, LOUTHEAN JOHN ALEXANDER]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |20130906||mybroadband.co.za||[http://mybroadband.co.za/news/internet/86271-south-africas-link-to-the-spy-files.html South Africa’s link to The Spy Files: WikiLeaks has once again linked South Africa to what it calls the “mass surveillance industry”]||[[ZA]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |20130904||wikileaks.org||[http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/GAMMA-2011-LoutNels-en.pdf GAMMA: Louthean Nelson]||[[GAMMA]] / [[NELSON, LOUTHEAN JOHN ALEXANDER]] / [[LB]] / [[DE]] / [[AE]] / [[LV]] / [[CH]] / [[ID]] / [[IT]] / [[MY]] / [[SG]] / [[GB]] / [[AT]] / [[RS]] / [[TR]] / [[CI]] / [[BJ]] / [[ZA]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |20130904||wikileaks.org||[http://www.wikileaks.org/spyfiles/docs/ELAMAN-2011-HolgRums-en.pdf ELAMAN: Holger Rumscheidt]||[[ELAMAN]] / [[RUMSCHEIDT, HOLGER]] / [[LB]] / [[DE]] / [[FR]] / [[CH]] / [[AE]] / [[AT]] / [[OM]] / [[ZA]] / [[ET]] / [[US]] / [[AZ]] / [[TM]] / [[JO]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |20130616||guardian.co.uk||[http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2013/jun/16/gchq-south-african-foreign-ministry How GCHQ stepped up spying on South African foreign ministry - UK hoped to find out everything it could about negotiating position of Thabo Mbeki's government]||[[GCHQ]] / [[NSA]] / [[ZA]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |20130430||citizenlab.org||[https://citizenlab.org/storage/finfisher/final/fortheireyesonly.pdf For their Eyes Only: The Commercialization of Digital Spying (Full Report)]||[[FINFISHER]] / [[GAMMA]] / [[AU]] / [[AT]] / [[BH]] / [[BN]] / [[BG]] / [[CA]] / [[CZ]] / [[EE]] / [[ET]] / [[DE]] / [[HU]] / [[IN]] / [[ID]] / [[JP]] / [[LV]] / [[LT]] / [[MK]] / [[MY]] / [[MX]] / [[MG]] / [[NL]] / [[NG]] / [[PK]] / [[PA]] / [[QA]] / [[RO]] / [[RS]] / [[SG]] / [[ZA]] / [[TR]] / [[TM]] / [[AE]] / [[GB]] / [[US]] / [[VN]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |20130430||citizenlab.org||[https://citizenlab.org/2013/04/for-their-eyes-only-2/ For Their Eyes Only: The Commercialization of Digital Spying]||[[FINFISHER]] / [[GAMMA]] / [[AU]] / [[AT]] / [[BH]] / [[BN]] / [[BG]] / [[CA]] / [[CZ]] / [[EE]] / [[ET]] / [[DE]] / [[HU]] / [[IN]] / [[ID]] / [[JP]] / [[LV]] / [[LT]] / [[MK]] / [[MY]] / [[MX]] / [[MG]] / [[NL]] / [[NG]] / [[PK]] / [[PA]] / [[QA]] / [[RO]] / [[RS]] / [[SG]] / [[ZA]] / [[TR]] / [[TM]] / [[AE]] / [[GB]] / [[US]] / [[VN]] | ||
| + | |- | ||
| + | |} | ||
| + | |||
| + | [[Category:Countries]] [[Category:ZA]] | ||
Latest revision as of 15:56, 2 September 2019
SOUTH AFRICA
Intel Environment
| Military Alliance | |
| Interior Intelligence Services | National Intelligence Agency (NIA) WP
South African Secret Service (SASS) WP Crime Intelligence Division, South African Police Service |
| Exterior Intelligence Services | |
| Military Intelligence Services | South African National Defence Force Intelligence Division (SANDF-ID) WP |
| SIGINT/COMINT Alliances |
Telco/Carrier/ISP Environment
| Type | Name | Ownership | URL | Notes |
| 3G 2100 | Cell C (Pty) Ltd (Cell C) | |||
| GSM 900/1800 | Cell C (Pty) Ltd (Cell C) | |||
| 3G 2100 | MTN - Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd. (MTN-SA) | MTN Group (ZA) | ||
| GSM 900 | MTN - Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd. (MTN-SA) | MTN Group (ZA) | ||
| 3G 900 | MTN - Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd. (MTN-SA) | MTN Group (ZA) | ||
| GSM 1800 | MTN - Mobile Telephone Networks (Pty) Ltd. (MTN-SA) | MTN Group (ZA) | ||
| 3G 2100 | Telkom SA Ltd (8ta) | |||
| GSM 1800 | Telkom SA Ltd (8ta) | |||
| GSM 900 | Vodacom Group Pty Ltd. (VodaCom) | |||
| 3G 2100 | Vodacom Group Pty Ltd. (VodaCom) |
Transnational Cables and Connections
| Type | Name | Ownership | Connecting Operator Point A | Connection Operator Point B | URL/Notes |
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_One_%28cable_system%29
SIGINT/COMINT Stations and Operators
Privacy Related Legislation
LI Legislation
- Regulation of Interception of Communications & Provision of Communications Act, No. 70/2000 related to the Information Act, 2002
SIGINT/COMINT Legal Grounds
Vendor Appearance
Vendors with Place of Registratio in South Africa
Vendors with Service / Installations in South Africa
Articles / Events / Situations
2019
| Date | Source | Title | Tags |
| 20190815 | privacyinternational.org | Two states admit bulk interception practices: why does it matter? | GB / ZA |
2018
| Date | Source | Title | Tags |
| 20180328 | qz.com | Mapped: The breathtaking global reach of Cambridge Analytica’s parent company | CAMBRIDGE ANALYTICA / US / GB / AR / CO / GY / UY / TT / GD / VC / LC / KN / AG / CY / NG / GA / KY / ZM / ZA / LV / LT / UA / RO / IT / MD / AL / IN / PK / NP / TH / ID / PH / MU |
2015
| Date | Source | Title | Tags |
| 20150803 | iol.co.za | ‘Grabber’ nabbed in big sting | ZA |
| 20150710 | wikileaks.org | HACKINGTEAM: /etc/LISTA.txt | HACKINGTEAM / US / NL / BY / MY / TR / SA / KW / IN / ID / AE / GR / SG / CZ / IT / DE / FR / NO / RS / CY / LT / ZA / HU / PL / DK / NZ / ZW / SI / KR / VA / CH / ES / CA / MT / UY / VN / BG / KZ / MO / HR / GT / QA / AT / SB / JP / RO / NA / FI / SE / RU / BN / LB / GH |
| 20150220 | mg.co.za | Securocrats serious about cyberwarfare | ZA |
2014
| Date | Source | Title | Tags |
| 20140915 | wikileaks.org | FinFisher - Customers | FINFISHER / GAMMA / COBHAM / DYPLEX COMMUNICATIONS / ELAMAN / TROVICOR / SK / MN / QA / ZA / BH / PK / EE / VN / AU / BE / NG / NL / SG / BD / HU / IT / BA |
| 20140606 | theguardian.com | Vodafone reveals existence of secret wires that allow state surveillance: Wires allow agencies to listen to or record live conversations, in what privacy campaigners are calling a 'nightmare scenario' | VODAFONE / AL / AU / BE / CZ / CG / EG / FJ / FR / DE / GH / GR / HU / IN / IE / IT / KE / LS / MT / MZ / NL / NZ / PT / QA / RO / ZA / ES / TZ / TR / GB |
